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 “Que faut-il faire pour vous aider?” asked Colbert. 
“Nous laisser faire,” answered Legendre.1 
 
Post-crisis financial re-regulation in place or underway in Hong Kong and elsewhere includes 
restrictions on forms of contracting and new rules governing business and financial product 
conduct. Measures of this kind may dampen activity but do little to protect investors or other 
users, nor mitigate against future instability. They resemble a swing towards state incursion 
on contracting of a kind regularly identified by legal scholars. To the extent that the state 
wishes to protect the interests of retail investors or speculative users of complex financial 
instruments there may be more merit in requiring “intelligent disclosure” specific to each 
class of instrument, and extending the doctrine of unconscionability to include financial 
instruments, as in certain circumstances in Australia. Outright contractual bans are an 
unreasonable and costly extension of state policy, the underlying purpose of which is to divert 
popular attention from regulatory failure, while highly prescriptive point of sale rules may 
make it less likely for legitimate complaints of mis-selling to succeed. 
                                                 
 Forthcoming in Law Lectures for Practitioners, University of Hong Kong, Faculty of Law. Elements 
of this article were presented at a University of Hong Kong seminar, ‘Current Issues in Global 
Regulation’, October 2009; Chinese University of Hong Kong colloquium, ‘Current Issues in Financial 
Regulation’, January 2010; University of Hong Kong conference, ‘Law Lectures for Practitioners’, 
September 2011; ICMA Centre & Henley Business School seminar, Hong Kong, December 2011; 
University of Hong Kong & University of New South Wales research colloquium, December 2012. 
1 J.M. Keynes, The End of Laissez-faire (1926), II, n. 2, in D. Moggridge (ed.) The Collected Writings 
of John Maynard Keynes, Vol. 9, Essays in Persuasion (London, Macmillan, 1971), reconstructing a 
17th century exchange between Louis XIV’s commerce minister and an aggrieved merchant. 




Post-crisis re-regulation of the global financial sector includes measures that will deliberately 
reduce the contractual freedom of both financial intermediaries and their counterparties. This 
trend is evident in Hong Kong, Singapore, the EU and US, and in more extreme forms 
through prohibitions on the sale of broad classes of instruments, as for example in Norway. It 
results from political demands for enhanced investor or consumer protection in response to 
mis-selling, or as part of a wish to contain systemic risks popularly associated since 2008 with 
complex financial instruments or derivatives. It differs from traditional point of sale 
regulation and sanctions against misconduct, and in Hong Kong and the UK, for example, 
signifies a failure of confidence in principles based regulation.2 
 
The sweep of regulation with which this article is concerned seeks to heighten investor 
protection through new product or business conduct rules. Product conduct regulation 
includes limits on uses of financial products such as credit linked or structured notes, credit 
default swaps, synthetic exchange traded funds (ETFs) and certain other transaction types 
with embedded derivatives, while rules over business conduct extend in prescriptive detail 
generally accepted provisions against mis-selling.3 Both trends raise concerns that re-
regulation may conflict unreasonably with contracting party autonomy.  
 
                                                 
2 Principles based regulation may take several distinct forms, see J. Black (2010) “The Rise, Fall and 
Fate of Principles Based Regulation” LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 17/2010, available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1712862> (visited 25 April 2013). It is treated 
here as favouring regulatory guidance over prescriptive rules. The UK regulator’s change in practice 
was signalled as a shift towards “outcomes based regulation” by the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA), see A. Turner, The Turner Review (London, FSA, 2009) pp 86-91, and characterised as “a more 
intrusive and direct regulatory style than the FSA has previously adopted [... requiring] a ‘braver’ [sic.] 
approach to decision making by supervisors”, see FSA (2009) “A Regulatory Response to the Global 
Banking Crisis”, Discussion Paper 09/2, p 186 (available at 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/policy/dp/2009> (visited 25 April 2013).  
3 Product or business conduct rules also differ from quantitative rules that directly affect financial 
practice and are typically introduced for stability reasons, notably simple restrictions on bank leverage 
or the ratio of new property loans to collateral value, both of which are commonly used in Asia. 
3 
Some states have traditionally required that regulators explicitly sanction new financial 
instruments, without which any contract of sale might be invalid or an instrument made 
unenforceable within the jurisdiction. Others grant national regulators broad executive 
powers, making their consent to new products a practical though non-specific necessity. Thus 
formal product approvals were required in Germany and Austria, for example, prior to the 
implementation of measures contributing to the EU’s single market in financial services 
including the investor protection focused Directive on Markets and Financial Instruments 
(MiFID),4 while Singapore has operated a less formal regime with prior approval of its 
Monetary Authority (MAS) customarily necessary for financial intermediaries to engage in 
new transactions with domestic counterparties, although historically with little or no statutory 
interference over contractual design. That financial contracts might be considered 
unenforceable has been associated with the treatment from time-to-time by certain 
jurisdictions of aleatory or gaming contracts, an approach resembling one suggested recently 
as a means to discourage speculative uses of certain derivative contracts.5 
 
This article will suggest that a compression of contractual freedom by product conduct 
regulation will reduce the choices reasonably available to both retail and other non-
professional financial market participants without lowering the potential for mis-selling or 
systemic instability. It will also argue that certain aspects of business conduct regulation may 
                                                 
4 Dir 2004/39/EC OJ L145. 
5 Courts in England and New York have found financial derivatives to be properly commercial rather 
than aleatory contracts that might be considered unenforceable, even when used for purposes accepted 
as speculative, see Morgan Grenfell & Co. Ltd. v Welwyn & Hatfield D.C. [1995] 1 All ER 1 (not fully 
reported); Korea Life Insurance Co. v Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York [2003] 269 F.Supp.2d 
424. An alternative view is that the uncertain outcome associated with many derivatives is tantamount 
to gambling such that they would be unenforceable in US common law were it not for supervening 
legislation, see L. Stout (2011) “Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis”, 1 Harv 
Bus L Rev 1, 1. A separate contention is that English courts have difficulty in enforcing some (but not 
all) derivatives where they concern intangible subjects, that is, for lack of an existing or material 
underlier at the time of execution, see H. Collins, Regulating Contracts (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1999), pp 209-218. This helps explain contracts being made in private organised markets or 
exchanges, the rules for enforcement of which participants are willing to accept. Many states eliminate 
such uncertainty with laws exempting financial contracts from gambling restrictions, and in the UK 
recent legislation removed any residual doubt that aleatory contracts were necessarily unenforceable 
(Gambling Act 2005 c.19 s.335). Some states treat derivative contracts as enforceable only when used 
for non-speculative purposes, as for example as Thailand, see S. Henderson, Henderson on Derivatives, 
2d ed. (London, LexisNexis, 2010), pp 536-9. 
4 
not assist in providing the investor with more complete or usable information, and may even 
weaken the position of non-professional investors seeking remedies for mis-selling, especially 
since the courts in Hong Kong and England have been reluctant to recognize retail users of 
complex or new products as non-professional. Many current reforms may also be seen in a 
longer-term perspective as a shift in the balance between contractual autonomy and state 
involvement in commercial activity, once characterised as a steady decline in freedom of 
contract under English law from a libertarian Victorian peak.6  
 
An alternative approach that would not involve a loss of welfare would be: 
 
 First, to require transaction arrangers to ensure that pertinent disclosure of how 
financial instruments function is made in dealings with retail and other non-
professional investors, whether or not they enjoy direct contact with those investors. 
This conforms with Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) guidance to banks (as 
licensed Authorised Institutions and not in a specific transactional capacity) but may 
have been weakened as a statutory requirement as the result of 2011 legislative 
changes initiated by the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC).7  
 Second, to extend the applicability of contractual unconscionability to include the 
mis-selling of financial services and instruments to retail investors or consumers of 
financial products where those contracts result from great bargaining inequality.8  
 
                                                 
6 P. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1979). Atiyah 
later partly recanted (as if acknowledging political shifts in the UK and US) by suggesting that the law 
oscillated between contractual freedom and state regulation, see idem “Freedom of Contract and the 
New Right”, in P. Atiyah, Essays on Contract (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988), p 355. 
7 See HKMA circular “Selling of Investment Products”, 5 January 2012 and see n 61 below and 
accompanying text. 
8 As allowed in certain circumstances in Australia, see Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission Act 2001 Sect. 12CA &. 12CB, and more recently in Singapore as a result of the 
Consumer Protection (Fair Trading) (Amendment) Act 2008 (Act 15 of 2008). US federal law has 
since 1965 allowed the court to declare unenforceable all or part of a contract found unconscionable at 
the time of execution (codifying earlier decisional law), see U.C.C. §2-302. The doctrine has generally 
been disfavoured by the courts in England and Hong Kong and confined by statute to the sale of goods. 
5 
Ignoring instances of business misconduct including fraud, negligence or misrepresentation at 
the point of sale, such provisions would have allowed considerable protection to non-
professional buyers of complex instruments of the types arranged by Lehman Brothers and 
sold extensively in a number of jurisdictions from 2000 until mid-2008.9  
 
This article will outline the perceived need for re-regulation and the measures adopted so far 
in Hong Kong and certain other jurisdictions towards those ends, before proposing an 
alternative approach to reform. It deals with most publicly distributed financial instruments 
whether or not listed on an organised exchange or regarded as securities in law, but especially 
those commonly regarded as complex, including structured notes, deposits and synthetic 
ETFs. The remarks it contains are not intended as a discussion of the individual’s rights or 
obligations or of positive or negative freedoms; no absolute freedom exists even if confined to 
the right to engage in trade or exchange.10 They will not address fraud, bargains involving 
negligent mis-statement or misrepresentation at the point of sale, nor the mis-selling of 
consumer credit or loans, although similar principles may apply to the last example.11 
Intermediaries are taken to function as transaction arrangers or distributors, the latter 
engaging with investors at the point of sale. A single organisation may take both roles through 
separate legal or administrative entities.  
                                                 
9 Including notably its Minibond brand of structured notes sold mainly in Hong Kong and Singapore in 
the period 2002-08. A generic description of the Minibond structure appears in P. Lejot (2008) 
”Dictum Non Meum Pactum: Lehman’s Minibond Transactions” 38 HKLJ 3, 585, although the design 
varied in detail between issues. The final transactions completed in 2008 were the largest of their 
respective Hong Kong and Singapore programmes, and were sold in Singapore one month prior to 
Lehman’s bankruptcy filing on 15 September 2008 and in Hong Kong three months earlier. 
10 See M. Pettit (1999) “Freedom, Freedom of Contract, and the "Rise And Fall"” 79 BU L Rev 263, 
282. Contrary examples exist where the courts have enforced contracts allowing odious debts to be 
recovered by distressed debt funds against very low income states despite their representing a moral 
abuse and contrary to public policy, see notably the English case Donegal International Ltd. v Zambia 
[2007] EWHC 197 (Comm), where the court found for the claimant but acknowledged that doing so 
offended against the G-8 economies agreeing in 2005 a part annulment of external claims against 
certain highly indebted poor states. Odious debts are liabilities incurred by a prior regime of a state that 
has undergone democratic reform. 
11 This has been subject to considerable academic and legislative attention in the US due to its 
experience with predatory and subprime mortgage lending, one analysis being instrumental in the 
creation of a federal Bureau of Consumer Finance Protection under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-203, §§1001-1100, see O. Bar-Gill & E. 
Warren (2008) “Making Credit Safer” 157 U Pa L Rev 1. 
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2. The need for re-regulation 
 
Hong Kong and Singapore are singular in that in each case many individual investors were 
impacted directly by Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy filing in September 2008.12 Recovery 
prospects for Hong Kong holders of the firm’s structured notes were unpredictable until July 
2009, unquantifiable until June 2011 or May 2012 depending on which series of notes were 
held, and are still uncertain for a minority that became general creditors of the Lehman 
estate.13 The SFC’s head gave a plain defence of caveat emptor to a Legislative Council panel 
within one month of the filing, stating that for buyers of structured notes arranged by Lehman 
“the requirement is to understand the features of the product” and “ask ‘why does it pay me 
more than the normal deposit of the bank?’”14. He also quoted without attribution passages 
from Lehman Minibond prospectuses stating that the defaulting issues “were backed by triple 
A collaterals [sic.] and the likely cumulative historical rate of failure for triple A collaterals 
over the past 25 years between 1981 and 2006 is 0.09 percent for the first three years.”15  
                                                 
12 Distress in other jurisdictions was largely confined to claimants in the bankruptcy, systemic 
problems associated with financial contagion and losses among professional counterparties on holdings 
of complex securities. 
13 Recovery rates for most Minibond series were between 73.5 and 95.1 per cent of principal, see 
HKMA press release “Further recovery of Minibond collateral”, 4 June 2012 (available at 
<http://www.hkma.gov.hk/eng/key-information/press-releases/2012/20120604-3.shtml> visited 25 
April 2013), far exceeding early expectations (excluding four series in which the collateral included 
direct obligations of Lehman). Public anger encouraged Hong Kong regulators to agree to cease 
investigating non-criminal point of sale misconduct in consideration for the main Minibond distributors 
repurchasing notes from most retail holders at discounts varying according to the noteholder’s status, 
the eventual value of realized collateral and a share of commissions paid to distributors by Lehman, see 
HKMA & SFC press release “SFC, HKMA and 16 banks reach agreement on Minibonds”, 22 July 
2009 (available at <http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/EN/sfcOpenDocServlet?docno=09PR100> 
visited 25 April 2013), and see also n 40 below. These settlements together covered approximately 
HK$9.5 billion (US$1.2 billion) of outstanding principal. Separate repurchases were negotiated in 
2010-11 with Hong Kong distributors of other Lehman structured notes. Singapore’s approach was 
more granular but realised similar recovery rates to Hong Kong. The MAS first prohibited several 
distributors from dealing in structured products, then gave support and guidance to individual 
complainants to seek redress from distributors, which it separately encouraged to settle but without the 
public general agreement concluded in Hong Kong. In both cases favourable repurchase terms were 
offered to the elderly and in some cases to noteholders with limited educational attainment. 
14 Testimony of Martin Wheatley, LC Paper No. CB (2) 216/08-09 at 37. 
15 Ibid. Three years was the contractual tenor of most Minibonds. The reference to historical default 
probability is identical to an assertion in the 2008 Minibond Series 36 issue prospectus at p 54, 
available at <http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/html/EN/general/general/lehman/lehman_structure_products.html> 
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This seems also to have been a defence of supervisory performance, either in suggesting that 
the risks associated with Lehman’s products were small until the firm’s collapse or that the 
SFC had earlier been justified in believing that they were. Losses suffered by most investors 
eventually proved modest (due to the regulators’ non-judicial negotiations and lapse of time 
allowing collateral to be fairly valued) but can largely be attributed to the transaction structure 
being poorly understood and subject to notable though inconspicuous legal risks. One further 
possibility is thus that the SFC may not have understood the transactions or the consequences 
of their design, with two results. First, conditions in the markets for many asset backed 
securities and CDOs softened in late 2006 and worsened materially from mid-2007, yet the 
SFC took no precautionary action in relation to new retail issues over the period through to 
October 2008 nor made any public warning of increasing risk.16 Second, the SFC required 
inclusion of too little usable information in prospectuses and transaction sale documents to 
allow most complex issues to be assessed and valued by any party other than arrangers such 
as Lehman or in some cases their distributors.17 
 
It is certainly appropriate to ask if complex instruments represent unequal bargains, either 
generically or within any single class of instrument, and to question the extent to which the 
many financial techniques and instruments developed in the two decades to 2008 has 
benefited the broader economy.18 What is the proper scope for their sale and is disclosure of 
                                                                                                                                            
(visited 25 April 2013). The statement misleadingly conflates the default performance of AAA 
corporate debt issues with those of AAA collateralised debt obligations (CDOs). The phrase “backed 
by [...] collateral” also wrongly suggests that during the life of the notes the principal outstanding 
would have been matched by the value of that collateral. 
16 Albeit that few reductions in credit ratings for structured issues were made until mid-2008. 
17 See Lejot n 9 above, p 592. 
18 The value of financial activity when not facilitating commerce, consumption or capital investment 
has long been disputed and not only in radical criticism of finance capitalism, see for example, C. 
Kindleberger, World Economic Primacy:1500-1990 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996), pp 212-
5, for whom it becomes synonymous with economic decline. Many post-crisis polemics using similar 
arguments are attributable to establishment commentators, see for example, W. Buiter, Useless 
Finance, Harmful Finance and Useful Finance, 12 April 2009, available at 
<http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/04/useless-finance-harmful-finance-and-useful-
finance/#axzz20LQTj8dx> (visited 25 April 2013); J. Stiglitz, Freefall: Free Markets and the Sinking 
of the Global Economy (London, Allen Lane, 2010); Turner, The Turner Review, see n 2 above). 
8 
their main commercial terms and payment outcomes sufficient for a buyer’s decision to be 
fairly informed, even with the imperative that they be presented in plain language as the SFC 
now requires?19 Was the Minibond debacle so clear a regulatory failure as to prompt a new 
approach? All genuinely new products challenge regulation because their novelty implies that 
they will not have been considered by regulators.20 Complex instruments are usually 
proprietary and may be contractually intensive and subject to legal uncertainty,21 making 
meaningful disclosure critical to investor assessment, especially with regard to a transaction’s 
purpose and how that is met by contractual structure. The need is shared equally by 
sophisticated and other users and regardless of any user’s motives or preferences. It is 
especially important since arrangers and distributors of structured products are commonly 
separate legal or administrative entities and investors must be assured that distributors fully 
share the arranger’s product knowledge.22 
                                                                                                                                            
Judging the welfare contribution of financial instruments is inevitably subjective, and a problem for 
regulators since they “cannot directly observe the preferences of their constituents, nor [...] have any 
practical means of aggregating these preferences into a social welfare function”, see D. Awrey 
(forthcoming 2012) “Complexity, Innovation and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets” 2 Harv 
Bus L Rev. This makes the regulator’s choice of policies indeterminate in their effect on general 
welfare, and increase the propensity for shocks or crises to result in retaliatory regulation. 
19 See n 61 below and accompanying text. 
20 J. Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial, and Trade Law 
(Oxford, Hart, 2010), pp 477-8. This need not create insuperable problems nor justify extensive 
product restrictions since modern finance has arguably produced few genuine transactional innovations 
but relies on an adaptive and marketing oriented process to suggest the contrary, see Q. Liu, P. Lejot & 
D. Arner, Finance in Asia, Institutions, Regulation and Policy (London, Routledge, forthcoming 2013), 
Ch. 7. 
21 For example, Lehman’s Hong Kong structured product prospectuses made no reference to some 
issues containing “flip clauses” that might materially alter the recovery rates of noteholders after a 
failure of the arranger. Flip or insolvency protection clauses are common in structured finance. They 
provide for the subordination of the claim of a swap counterparty (usually associated with the 
transaction arranger) to those of noteholders in the event of embedded swaps being terminated. Their 
aim is to maintain the priority of noteholders over transactional collateral prevailing prior to a 
termination event, which would otherwise be upset by standard International Swaps and Derivative 
Association (ISDA) practice. Lehman’s flip clauses were tested in litigation after the firm’s bankruptcy 
with conflicting results in England, where the Supreme Court found that they caused no loss in value to 
the bankrupt estate and thus did not offend a common law anti-deprivation rule (Belmont Park 
Investments Pty. Ltd. v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd. & Lehman Brothers Special Financing 
Inc. [2011] UKSC 38), and in New York, where they were found to conflict with the US Bankruptcy 
Code and thus ruled invalid (Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. v BNP Corporate Trustee 
Services Ltd., Summary Judgment No. 09-01242 (JMP), US Bankruptcy Court, SDNY 25 January 
2010). The decision in Belmont was welcomed by market participants but it has been argued that 
special circumstances might limit its application, see S. Worthington (2012) “Good Faith, Flawed 
Assets and the Emasculation of the UK Anti-Deprivation Rule” 75 MLR 1, 112. Uncertainty as to the 
effectiveness of flip clauses is certain to prompt revisions to standardised documentation. 
22 This is a concern of industry bodies such as ISDA, see Joint Associations Committee on Retail 
Structured Products (2007) “Retail Structured Products: Principles for managing the provider-
9 
 
This suggests that supervisory insight is necessary, not mere point of sale regulation. By 
contrast, the risk of loss and difficulties in investor assessment are commonly taken for 
granted in ordinary shares, convertible bonds and other instruments, all supposedly non-
complex claims.23 The approach proposed here is consistent with the original objectives of the 
MiFID “information model”,24 to recognise that financial regulation ought properly to 
accommodate bounded rationality as well as investor behaviour commonly accepted as 
rational, and so provide guidance or support to needful investors without unduly limiting the 
contractual freedom of those who do not want or have no need for excessive advice or 
assistance.25 
 
Complex products are conceptually easy to grasp and difficult to define, a combination 
analogous to their appeal to buyers. They may have many differing characteristics, and are 
often but not necessarily intended for risk preferring users. Complex instruments can be 
wholly unaggressive in both structure or intention, and designed according to demand for 
capital preservation or targeted to conservative investors just as often as they include leverage 
or uncertain outcomes for the risk preferring. They include instruments whose returns are 
contingent upon one or more exogenous events, and will often incorporate derivative 
                                                                                                                                            
distributor relationship” July 2007, available at < 
http://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/RSP%20Principles%20REVISEDFINAL.pdf> (visited 25 
April 2013). Information flows can be poor even when one organisation is both arranger and 
distributor, as in a leading English misrepresentation case where a credit linked deposit arranged by 
one unit was wrongly described by a second as constituting rights against the deposit’s reference entity 
(Peekay Intermark Limited & Another v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2005] EWHC 
830 (Comm), [2006] EWCA Civ 386).  
23 Equities are customarily taken to represent easily assessed claims. Shareholders in the HSBC group 
received a 2010 annual report of 397 pages, including an eight page glossary of terms and 88 pages on 
risks within the bank but without mention of specific legal risks, for example those relating to US 
regulatory investigations into money laundering or mortgage lending conduct that became public in 
2011-12. See also n 28 below. 
24 See L. Klöhn (2009) “Preventing Excessive Retail Investor Trading under MiFID: A Behavioural 
Law & Economics Perspective” 10 EBOR 437.  
25 Ibid at 440. The principle of libertarian (non-legal) paternalism accommodates bounded rationality 
and represents “an approach that preserves freedom of choice but that authorizes both private and 
public institutions to steer people in directions that will promote their welfare” R. Thaler & C. Sunstein 
(2003) “Libertarian Paternalism” 93 Amer Econ Rev 2, 175, 179. See also C. Sunstein & R. Thaler 
(2003) “Libertarian Paternalism is not an Oxymoron” 70 U Chi L Rev 4, 1159. 
10 
elements, in some cases subject to variation during the life of the transaction such as with 
many synthetic ETFs and accumulators, or rolling option contracts. Legislation may grant 
authority to a regulator to pronounce upon the complexity of an instrument, and in some cases 
make disclosure demands of its seller or indicate that the product may not be made available 
outside a defined constituency, for example a limited number of non-retail counterparties, a 
consumer protection approach to securities regulation originating in the US. Contractual 
complexity is taken here to mean debt instruments or shares in synthetic ETFs that have an 
embedded derivative content that is not ordinarily separable.26 In these cases contracts may be 
simple to express and execute but their design will usually be intricate. 
 
The growth in issuance of complex securities from the 1990s took two main forms, through 
widely distributed securitised transactions and by highly rated frequent borrowers using debt 
issuance programmes to sell bespoke structured notes. The latter are issued at the instigation 
of professional intermediaries or high net worth (HNW) investors to suit their risk-return 
preferences or expectations at any time, a process known as reverse enquiry. An investor 
believing that its needs are met by a three year US dollar note putable to the issuer during its 
life if aviation fuel doubles in price can value the required option (or ask its advisor to do so), 
discount the cost against an interest rate index benchmark and approach the World Bank, for 
example, asking that it issue notes on such terms in an amount of the investor’s choice. If the 
proposal meets the World Bank’s published target borrowing costs then the issue will be 
agreed, ‘printed’ and settled quickly, the cost of funds subsidised by the value of the option 
sold to the investor.  
 
                                                 
26 Callable, convertible and exchangeable bonds can be similarly complex but by custom are treated 
otherwise and thus inconsistently excluded from definitions of “structured product” added to the 
Securities and Futures Ordinance (SFO) Cap 571 in 2011, see n 55 below. Cash and synthetic ETFs are 
taken here as respectively simple and complex arrangements, but this distinction is not formally 
recognised in Hong Kong, nor for example in new disclosure guidelines issued by the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) intended “to protect investors by providing guidance on the 
information that should be communicated with respect to […] ETFs”, see ESMA “Guidelines on ETFs 
and other UCITS issues” Report & Consultation Paper 2012/474, 25 July 2012, p 43, available at 
<http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2012-474_0.pdf> (visited 25 April 2013). 
11 
The terms of this example would be worthless or costly to most investors but might suit an 
airline treasury that expected to be cash rich unless aviation fuel rose unexpectedly in price 
within three years. This description differs in no material respect from complex issues sold to 
retail buyers except that it results from broadly equal bargaining, even in highly structured 
deals. While the HNW or professional investor can readily command the attention of the 
issuer or arranger, it is impossible for retail investors to match that positional equality since 
the transactions they enter are largely standardised and the result of proprietary sales rather 
than bargaining.27 True negotiations would be impossible due to excessive costs and the 
statutory imperative for all investors to receive like information. 
 
Three possible solutions with respect to retail investors are first, to prohibit all sales of 
complex transactions; second, to circumscribe the available choice of instruments or risks; 
and third, to compel intelligent disclosure so as to lessen their bargaining inequality. Only the 
third alternative allows broad contractual autonomy. Many jurisdictions adopt the second but 
the results can become arbitrary and more exculpatory than to serve investor protection.28 
Since retail buyers are unable to bargain with distributors they must have access to reasonably 
presented information sufficient to judge the expected risks and return associated with 
complex instruments and how they compare with competing transactions based on similar 
risks or underlying assets, including instruments commonly regarded as contractually simple. 
                                                 
27 For an explanation of the dilemma of the courts as to whether to interfere in severely unequal 
contracts in standard form see F. Kessler (1943) “Contracts of Adhesion” 43 Colum L Rev 629, 633. 
28 For example, the SFC sought in 2010 to discourage retail buyers from participating in a new issue of 
ordinary shares by United Company Rusal Limited (Rusal) by requiring applications to be in amounts 
of no less than HK$1.0 million and subsequent dealings to be in lots of at least 200,000 shares 
(representing a consideration of HK$888,000 as at 29 June 2012). It also required the offering 
prospectus to carry an unusual warning stating “An investment in shares in [Rusal] involves significant 
risk. investors may lose part or all of the value of their investment. Shares [in Rusal] should only be 
bought and traded by persons who are particularly knowledgeable in investment matters and can afford 
to lose their investment”, see United Company Rusal Limited Global Offering Prospectus, Hong Kong, 
31 December 2009. Rusal was loss making in the three six-monthly accounting periods prior to the date 
of the prospectus, which would ordinarily preclude a full Hong Kong listing. The SFC’s actions 
arguably lessen liquidity in Rusal shares, dilute the rights of shareholders in the event that the 
prospectus proved to contain material errors, introduce uncertainty in the application of Hong Kong’s 
listing rules, and may weaken the rights of any retail investors that chose to ignore the prospectus 
warning and buy shares in Rusal. Minimum subscriptions and denominations are common practice in 
the international debt capital markets for reasons of cost and often to allow exemption under Securities 
and Exchange Commission Rule 144A from US securities registration. 
12 
A buyer’s autonomy implies a ‘right to make a fool of [itself]’,29 but properly supervised 
intelligent disclosure is a safeguard for this to be generally acceptable. Disclosure of 
contractual risks and structure and of the arranger’s commercial purpose are critical to any 
non-professional investor’s assessment given the existence of unequal bargaining power. It 
also represents a demanding change from current practice. 
 
3. Investor protection 
 
The concerns of early investor protection law were price fairness and investment advice rather 
than product design.30 The US adopted a consumer protection ethic in the 1930s, requiring 
securities to be registered if intended for sale to retail investors and allow issuer disclosure to 
be standardised. The means by which any instrument is sold has traditionally been a function 
of broader legal considerations in Anglo-American jurisdictions, so that product conduct was 
not a focus of supervisory attention. Most jurisdictions distinguish professional and retail 
users of financial products in order to focus investor protection on those assumed to be most 
in need, and as a corollary to allow relatively wider contractual freedom to others. Retail 
refers to a non-professional party expected to participate modestly in any transaction, and it is 
generally defined either by inference with the protagonist deemed not to be sophisticated or 
professional, or by proxy with a ceiling on net worth or income that suggests that financial 
losses would cause material harm to a less well resourced user. Hong Kong currently treats as 
professional any individual investor with securities, deposits and cash totalling HK$8.0 
million (US$1.03 million).31  
                                                 
29 L. Loss (1963) “The Protection of Investors: I The Role of Government” 80 SALJ 53, 60, cited in 
Klöhn see n 24 above, p 439.  
30 Dalhuisen, see n 20 above, p 470, and see n 43 below. 
31 SFO Cap 571 Sch. 1 Part 1 s 1 and Securities and Futures (Professional Investor) Rules, Cap 571D s 
3. In addition, HKMA business conduct rules categorise private bank investor clients by reference to 
minimum investible funds or assets under management, which serves further to isolate the retail 
segment by inference, see HKMA circular “Selling of Investment Products to Private Banking 
Customers”, 12 June 2012, available at <http://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/doc/key-
information/guidelines-and-circular/2012/20120612e1.pdf> (visited 25 April 2013). 
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Although modern investor protection law and regulation hope to protect the retail segment 
this lack of an accepted definition (other than as a indication of what it is not) often leaves the 
courts to decide the status of an investor by enquiring into its past behaviour and expressed 
preferences at the point of sale. The results are twofold. First, an investor’s financial literacy 
is habitually generalised when complaints are heard, with experience in one activity leading 
the courts to connote knowledge of another or risk behaviour being assumed to be constant 
over time. Second, it has become standard practice even when not a matter of law or 
regulation for distributors of financial instruments to require investors to make formal 
declarations at the time of sale that absolve the distributor from liability in contract formation 
or prevent a later claim being made for mis-selling. The practice of contractual estoppel may 
contribute to efficiency when involving professional parties but is limiting and potentially 
oppressive when a retail investor is seeking redress.  
 
More generally the lack of an explicit understanding of what constitutes a retail investor has 
made the courts in Hong Kong and England reluctant to protect those that they consider 
apparently active or sophisticated traders, in some cases with unpredictable results.32 There 
have thus been few recent successful actions for mis-selling even in the post-2008 period, and 
a number of cases where the court’s assessment of evidence in dismissing a complaint would 
have surprised informed financial sector opinion. The leading English misrepresentation case 
Peekay is one such illustration.33 An investor suffered material losses from a credit linked 
bank deposit referenced to domestic Russian treasury bills (GKOs). A credit event occurred in 
August 1998 and the deposit lost most of its value when Russia declared a payment 
moratorium on domestic state debt. The bank accordingly settled the investor’s claim with a 
                                                 
32 Conforming with a traditional reluctance to examine the motives of parties entering financial 
contracts in the absence of malfeasance, although several recent English cases dealing with contractual 
ambiguities have been decided not on a literal reading of terms but what the court considered a 
reasonable interpretation of intent, see Rainy Sky S.A. & Others v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50; in 
re Sigma Finance Corporation (in administrative receivership) and in re the Insolvency Act 1986 
[2009] UKSC 2. 
33 See n 22 above. 
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partial payment of the nominal value of the deposit. Expecting to have retained either direct 
or subrogated rights over GKOs, the investor began an action to recover its loss by 
complaining of having entered the transaction as a result of misrepresentations. The high 
court found for the investor but was overruled on appeal. 
 
The deposit was arranged and marketed to investors by units of ANZ Bank including one 
dealing with HNW clients; Peekay was a corporate vehicle used by one such client, a Mr 
Pawani. Evidence considered in the case showed that individuals concerned with the 
transaction in both arranging and distribution sections of ANZ did not fully understood its 
structure and commercial terms, and these were misrepresented to the investor orally and 
through an indicative term sheet prior to its agreeing in principle to the trade. The bank 
repeatedly made errors in communications with the investor, including issuing a contract 
confirmation between execution and settlement mischaracterising the deposit as a direct claim 
against the underlier, inadvertently confirming the investor’s understanding of the deal from 
earlier exchanges. ANZ’s appeal was allowed on two grounds; first, that pre-completion 
misrepresentations were cured by the investor subsequently signing (although without fully 
reading) a second term sheet that for the most part gave a correct description of the deposit; 
and second, a five page standard form risk disclosure statement also signed by the investor at 
the time of execution constituted a contractual estoppel that prevented Peekay from claiming 
not to have understood the risk of the transaction and by implication its structure, which had 
been the reason for the complaint.34 
 
Without questioning the intention of its eventual finding, the case raises three concerns, the 
first being the high court’s assessment of Mr Pawani’s standing as an investor. Siberry, Dep. 
J. stated that: 
                                                 
34 ANZ’s risk disclosure statement included the paragraph addressed to the investor “Before making 
any investment in an emerging markets instrument, you should [...] ensure that you fully understand the 
nature of the transaction and contractual relationship into which you are entering and the nature and 
extent of your exposure to risk of loss [...]."  
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‘Mr Pawani has considerable investment experience, and is clearly a man of 
substantial means. He was described by Mr Gordon Wood, formerly of ANZ and one 
of the Claimants' witnesses as "a sophisticated individual and an experienced trader." 
He has, for example, traded in bullion since 1984. Mr Pawani gave evidence that 
Peekay's investments would typically include instruments such as bonds, bills, 
emerging market instruments, bullion, currencies and derivatives with major 
international banks. He first started investing in emerging market instruments [sic.] 
with ANZ in 1996.’35  
 
The investor was taken to be sophisticated and risk preferring, and by implication either had 
adequate knowledge of synthetic credit instruments and the permissibility of non-domestic 
parties acquiring interests in GKOs, or the means to become satisfied as to such questions. 
His reported behaviour suggests otherwise. Product specialisation is common in the financial 
sector, meaning that insight into one market is no necessary indication of knowledge of a 
second. Contracts and practices in market segments are often highly dissimilar and an expert 
in one field will typically know only superficially about others. Mr Pawani agreed to make 
the deposit believing that it would represent a direct claim against the reference entity rather 
than a conditional claim against ANZ. The bank was itself confused as to whether and how it 
was permitted to hold GKOs (and the court was not told whether ANZ had hedged its GKO 
risk) but its contact with Mr Pawani made representations to the effect that the investor would 
buy an interest in a GKO with its rouble return hedged into US dollars. A truly experienced 
and sophisticated investor would have known such a claim to be unreliable. 
 
                                                 
35 [2005] EWHC 830 (Comm), para 6, whose assessment was accepted by the appeal court. By contrast 
a later English mis-selling case involving similar but far greater losses included an exhaustive enquiry 
to establish whether the investor was sophisticated, so allowing the court to define the scope of duties 
owed by the selling bank to the investor, see JP Morgan Chase Bank and others v Springwell 
Navigation Corp. [2008] EWHC 1186 (Comm); [2010] EWCA Civ 1221.. 
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A second concern was acknowledged at first instance and appeal, that the bank as both 
arranger and distributor had a demonstrable lack of understanding of its product. ANZ 
devised the deposit only weeks before beginning investor marketing, its experience of 
synthetic or direct GKO risk being confined to distributing deals arranged by a more 
proficient competitor with operations in Russia. ANZ made errors in product design, point of 
sale conduct and post-execution administration, and several bank witnesses engaged in the 
transaction admitted their confusion in evidence. Although the text of the final term sheet sent 
to Mr Pawani was broadly accurate, it included an erroneous heading of “USD hedged 
Russian Treasury Bill” and several other errors of detail. The header encapsulated Mr 
Pawani’s understanding of the transaction resulting from the earlier misrepresentations and he 
and a colleague signified in writing Peekay’s agreement to the transaction without fully 
reading the document. This failure of compliance by a sophisticated party (however common 
in practice) provided grounds for the appeal court’s decision, with Peekay’s professed 
confidence that ANZ would behave competently and professionally being one element in that 
failure. The investor’s deemed status meant that it was owed no broad duty of care by ANZ, 
either as arranger or distributor. The courts did not discuss whether a more narrowly drawn 
duty existed for ANZ to avoid negligence in presenting and negotiating the transaction, 
especially since it was initiated by the distribution unit soliciting a trade. The bank failed to 
notify Peekay of the credit event and the resulting early termination of the deposit, and the 
court heard evidence (incredulous to an observer) that several employees debated how the 
claim represented by the deposit might participate in post-moratorium negotiations, that is, to 
ignore the contractual provisions of the deposit. 
 
The third concern arises in a wider context from the appeal court’s decision that the investor 
was prevented from claiming that it entered the transaction as a result of misrepresentation 
having signed the distributor’s risk disclosure statement when agreeing the final term sheet. 
The statement required the investor to warrant that it had read and understood the terms of the 
transaction and was held to function as a contractual estoppel to prevent Peekay from 
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asserting that it had not done so. According to Chadwick, LJ, ‘[t]herefore Peekay must be 
taken to have accepted that ANZ would have assumed that Peekay fully understood the nature 
of the transaction into which it was entering.’36 This decision could forestall enquiry into 
reasonable complaints in a context where bargaining is less equal even than Peekay. It also 
represents an example of divergence between law and market practice that may be known and 
accepted by professional parties but is baffling to others. 
 
Similar questions as to the completeness of information provided to investors and the court’s 
assessment of investor sophistication arose in two Hong Kong criminal cases. Both ended in 
the acquittal of employees of the largest local distributor by volume of Lehman structured 
products, Bank of China Hong Kong Ltd (BOCHK), on charges of fraudulently or recklessly 
inducing others to invest money. In the first example a BOCHK officer who had marketed 
financial products to bank clients since 2002 was acquitted of nine offenses, the District Court 
finding prosecution evidence given by several aggrieved holders of Lehman structured 
products to be unreliable and contradictory, but noting that the distributor’s point of sale 
procedures were poor.37 
                                                 
36 [2006] EWCA Civ 386 at para 70. 
37 Re Cheung Kwai Kwai DCCC 526/2010, per Tallentire, J. stated at para 157 of the accused “You 
also took us through the procedure for the completion of the forms which I accept was not totally ideal. 
You fairly accepted that your preparation and study of the leaflet, and especially the prospectus had not 
been as deep or as comprehensive as one would have wished […] you made no written notes about 
your advice to each of your customers.” He also stated at para 126 that “a person selling such bonds 
and notes had a duty to give sufficient information to the public so an informed decision could be made 
as to whether or not to accept the high risk in return for relatively high interest rates […].” As part of 
evidence to an earlier legislative enquiry BOCHK’s chief executive was asked, “Did BOCHK have any 
mechanism to vet/review the contents and presentation of the marketing materials vis-à-vis the offer 
documentation such as the prospectus? […] If no, how did BOCHK ensure that there was no 
misrepresentation of product information and adequate disclosure of risks in such materials?” The bank 
replied “BOCHK did not vet or review the contents and presentation of the marketing materials vis-à-
vis the offer documentation. It was the responsibility of Lehman Brothers Asia Ltd as the arranger and 
Sun Hung Kai Investment Services Limited as the co-ordinating dealer to prepare the marketing 
materials and submit them to the SFC for approval” see He Guangbei, written statement to Hong Kong 
Legislative Council Subcommittee to Study Issues Arising from Lehman Brothers-related Minibonds 
and Structured Financial Products, SC Ref.No.SC(1)-W40(C), September 2010 at Question 22, 
available at <http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr08-09/english/hc/sub_com/hs01/report/documents/w40c-
e.pdf> (visited 25 April 2013). Asked to explain the structure and cash flow of Minibonds Series 35, 
BOCHK’s submission merely repeated a brief summary of terms identical to those headlined in 
Lehman marketing material, with no mention of how the structure of the issue functioned, see ibid. at 
Question 3.1. This enquiry took no evidence from former Lehman employees who arranged structured 
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Identical problems of witness reliability were found in the second case, in which a further 
matter resembles the finding as to investor sophistication in Peekay.38 The court heard that 
one witness and Lehman noteholder: 
 
“agreed in cross examination that in her witness statement she had said that she had 
no previous experience in buying and selling bonds. Clearly that was not true. The 
court was unable to accept that this was just a minor unwitting mistake. Although 
PW1 was a housewife [sic.], she had prior investment experience [and] the Minibond 
investment was not her first. Despite her claims in only investing in low risk 
conservative investments it was elicited in cross-examination that she had previously 
subscribed to a high risk product which was an equity linked deposit.39 Her low risk 
investments were inconsistent with her [investment preference questionnaire] in 
which she indicated that her investment preference was assessed as moderate or 
moderate aggressive.  
 
Thus the purchase on one occasion of an equity linked note contributed to the court finding 
the witness unreliable and not unsophisticated. These are criminal cases with demanding 
evidential standards but nonetheless suggest how a retail investor’s modest prior activity can 
be judged risk preferring.40 An equity linked note does not necessarily entail high risk, and 
                                                                                                                                            
transactions nor from Sun Hung Kai Investment Services, which instigated the Minibond programme 
with Lehman, but only from banks and government officials, perhaps because the subcommittee’s 
political focus was with the SAR government and the HKMA. 
38 HKSAR v. Tai Ching DCCC 527 and 1272/2010. 
39 Emphasis added. Complexity and risk are not synonymous, just as simplicity and risk are not 
antonyms. 
40 This principle appears (although more generously to noteholders) in the settlement conditions of 
Minibond claims negotiated with Hong Kong distributors, see n 13 above. The recovery outcomes were 
more favourable for noteholders aged over 65, and the settlement excluded investors deemed to be 
experienced, that is, those of any age “who in the three years preceding their first purchase of 
Minibonds, executed five or more transactions in Leveraged Products or Structured Products”, as 
defined in the SFO, see ibid. HKMA & SFC press release at Note 2. The MAS behaved similarly using 
age and education levels as proxies for financial literacy and thus influencing the scale of the 
noteholder’s recovery. 
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investor preferences change over time, indeed Minibonds and similar products were 
transparently riskier in 2007-08 than three or four years earlier.41 As with Peekay, it is unclear 
from these verdicts whether the distributor or its employees understood the product 
sufficiently to present an appropriate explanation to any investor, and the value of 
representations made by non-professional investors as to point of sale conduct must in turn be 
subject to doubt. However confused the witnesses may have been, their declarations of 
modest risk preferences were additionally taken to conflict with past behaviour.42  
 
4. Post-crisis regulatory reform 
 
Popular and political fury has driven much post-crisis re-regulation, leading inevitably to 
overreaction in Hong Kong and elsewhere.43 The clearest example of widespread post-crisis 
sale restrictions may be in Norway, where the Financial Supervisory Authority 
(Kredittilsynet) prohibited dealing in structured instruments with non-professional parties in 
2008, despite simultaneously adopting MiFID as a basis for domestic regulation. 
Kredittilsynet was responding to public disquiet over transaction losses suffered by several 
                                                 
41 Large banks featured less prominently as distributors in the final issues although this may have 
perversely led to more aggressive selling by less capable firms. BOCHK declined to distribute the final 
Hong Kong issue due to its perception of worsening general conditions, an action that at the time might 
have deserved regulatory attention and being made public, stating later that “Having considered the 
uncertain market conditions [in March 2008] BOCHK did not participate in the distribution of Series 
36”, see statement of He Guangbei, n 37 above. Most distributors procured orders for Lehman notes 
rather than bought and sold at issue so BOCHK’s decision to withdraw from marketing a product with 
which it had been prolifically engaged for five years was not based on exposure to market risk. 
42 A related point concerns society’s expectations of the behaviour of the reasonable investor and how 
this might influence the courts, see J. Heminway (2009) “Female Investors and Securities Fraud: Is the 
Reasonable Investor a Woman?” 15 Wm & Mary J Women & L 291. Empirical studies controlling for 
financial literacy suggest that women are more risk averse in considering investments and other 
financial decisions than men, see ibid. at n 9. If an investor’s preferences are to be judged as risk 
preferring or risk averse in a mis-selling dispute it may be unreasonable for the court to base the 
outcome on a notion of what is reasonable for the average male, given that the court is unlikely in 
either case to consider bounded rationality in forming a view. What the courts see as “reasonable” in 
this regard may be gender based. 
43 This is not an entirely new phenomenon. US public anger after the 1929 Great Crash produced 
“insistent demand for federal legislation” see E.M. Dodd (1942) “Investor Protection by Administrative 
Agency: The United States Securities and Exchange Commission 5 MLR 3-4, 174, 175. 
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local authorities,44 and forced the closure of the securities firm that interceded between 
municipal officials and transaction arrangers. Kredittilsynet presupposed that “structured 
products or other complex products [should not be sold] to customers who cannot be regarded 
as professional investors”,45 although defining “professional” narrowly to mean financial 
intermediaries and exclude commercially sophisticated parties as well as retail users.46 
Norway’s highly risk averse approach can be contrasted with customary regulation of the sale 
of goods, for example to require that a vehicle or refrigerator be fit for purpose or meet safety 
and environmental standards. It is understandable that loss aversion encourages cautious 
regulation even when no systemic concerns arise,47 nonetheless the results may be less 
successful than intelligent reforms of compliance and disclosure standards, as well as 
unnecessarily reducing contractual autonomy. 
 
National and transnational reforms agreed by the G-20 states in 2009 represent a shift from 
principles based models and include a withdrawal from MiFID-style objectives. Certain states 
set new wide ranging missions, for example the US Wall Street Financial Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 seeks presumptively “to protect consumers from abusive 
financial services practices”,48 although it is unclear that its implementation will make a 
material difference to consumers except in relation to loans. The FSA conducted a review of 
UK structured retail product conduct in 2009-12, concluding with recommendations for 
                                                 
44 Two municipal authorities contracted in off market interest rate swaps involving expected future 
revenues, using the resulting upfront payments to buy CDOs that later collapsed in value. The 
transactions were entered partly to circumvent borrowing restrictions imposed by central government, 
the use of proceeds was a failure in compliance and the local government officers concerned 
demonstrably failed to understand the swap or CDO transactions. The domestic courts ruled that the 
swaps were loans, and consequently void since the authorities were empowered to borrow only for 
public works and purposes defined by law. Norway’s media portrayed rogue financiers tricking hapless 
public servants and incited sharp political and regulatory responses. An English court later allowed a 
claim in restitution by the swap counterparty to recover sums paid to the authorities, see Haugesund 
Kommune, Narvik Kommune v. Depfa ACS Bank, Wikborg Rein & Co [2009] EWHC 2227. 
45 Kredittilsynet’s Securities Institutions Section head stated that the prohibition reflected complex 
products being sold not “in a regulated market, but in a non-transparent, shady market; […] they were 
elements in the current financial turmoil” see E. Kleven “Supervision and Regulation of the Structured 
Products Market in Norway” Structured Products Europe Conference, London, 12 November 2008. 
46 Ibid. 
47 See C. Sunstein (2003) “Beyond the Precautionary Principle” 151 U Pa L Rev 3, 1003. 
48 Dodd-Frank Act Pub. L. 111-203. 
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compliance within financial intermediaries and other service providers such as the 
establishment of internal product review committees.49 The FSA declines to categorise its 
proposals as a framework for supervisory conduct, even though the authority is able so to act 
through being empowered to provide de facto approval of contract terms,50 as will be its 
successor Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) from 2013. 
 
The extent to which regulators use discretion to intervene in product conduct is controversial, 
both in relation to permissible instruments and the nature of disclosure to investors. This is 
shown in exchanges between the FSA and a UK parliamentary committee and which bear on 
developments in Hong Kong. The committee observed that post-crisis re-regulation will 
include “a more proactive approach to conduct regulation, with a clear focus on consumer 
outcomes”,51 and approvingly proposed “judgement-led product intervention by the 
regulator”,52 including passing to the FCA authority currently held by the FSA to make public 
warnings over specific products.53 Yet mild activism of this kind was rejected by the FCA’s 
chief executive designate, who cited his SFC experience in stating that pre-approval of simple 
financial products was too burdensome for regulators, with products:  
 
                                                 
49 FSA, “Retail Product Development and Governance: Structured Products Review: Finalised 
Guidance”, March 2012 (available at <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/policy/final_guides/2012/fg1209> 
visited 25 April 2013). A more developed proposal would align regulatory requirements with internal 
bank “new product committee” procedures to provide a self-certification mechanism and avoid 
regulatory capture, see M. Armstrong, G. Cornut, S. Delacôte, M. Lenglet, Y. Millo, F. Muniesa, A. 
Pointier & Y. Tadjeddine, (2012) “Towards a Practical Approach to Responsible Innovation in 
Finance: New Product Committees Revisited” 20 J F R & C 2, 147. 
50 Ibid at 34. The FSA may challenge the fairness of contracts under the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999 but is not empowered to judge whether fairness is met by any subsequent 
modification in terms. This may not represent an enhanced formula for point of sale regulation but is 
certainly a shift from principles based regulation, which itself can be a complex interaction between 
regulation instigated by legislation, common law and the soft law that results from industry guidance or 
that of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), see J. Benjamin and D. 
Rouch (2007) “Providers and Distributors: Responsibilities in Relation to Retail Structured Products” 1 
LFMR 6, 413, 419.  
51 House of Commons Treasury Committee, Financial Conduct Authority (HC 1574) January 2012, 
para 138. 
52 Ibid at para 145. 
53 Ibid at para 160. 
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 “brought to you half-baked, because the industry wants to rush the products out. The 
regulator ends as up as the spell check for the industry, because they bring such 
poorly thought through products in the hope that they will have a place in the 
window. I think pre-approval is quite a difficult process and has many more 
negatives.”54  
 
These remarks might surprise Hong Kong finance specialists who see the approach to new 
issues and products of the SFC and the stock exchange’s listing department as heavily 
procedural, contributing more to the length and homogeneity of disclosure documents than to 
useful content. Of greater concern is that they suggest a desire to avoid accountability that 
cannot be reconciled with recent regulatory failures, and that might be characterised as an 
unreasonable extension of a public interest indemnity.  
 
Post-crisis product reforms introduced in Hong Kong since 2010 involve changes to the 
Companies Ordinance and SFO, regulations issued under the SFO covering point of sale 
conduct and the scope of engagement by the SFC, and additions to the SFC’s codes of 
conduct and guidance handbooks for industry participants, the latter constituting neither 
primary nor subsidiary legislation. Four elements are relevant to this discussion: 
 
 Prospectus rules for most structured products (as defined in the SFO) are no longer 
subject to the Companies Ordinance and associated with unlisted debentures but 
included in the SFO and now relate to securities. This could ostensibly allow closer 
regulation of their content except that the SFC’s functional focus appears to be with 
business conduct.  
                                                 
54 Ibid at para 187, and see n 14 above and accompanying text. 
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 Amendments to the SFO permit the SFC to authorize or withhold authorisation for 
the sale of structured products,55 or impose conditions on a product or its uses.56 They 
also allow the SFC to designate additional instruments as structured products, while 
excluding certain others, presumably due to their supposed familiarity to investors. 
The distinction is arbitrary, implying that not all complex financial instruments are 
apparently structured products. Expressly excluded from the definition are 
convertible and exchangeable bonds, equity warrants, and all products authorised 
under the Betting Duty Ordinance, Gambling Ordinance or Government Lotteries 
Ordinance.57 A new template indicates information required by the SFC when asked 
to authorise a structured issue, which includes self-certification by arrangers or 
issuers of their compliance with SFC guidance, but the framework is procedural 
rather than capturing the commercial and structural core of a proposed transaction.58 
 Business conduct guidelines issued by the SFC acknowledge the bargaining 
inequality associated with retail sales of structured instruments by suggesting a 
cooling off period of at least five days is granted between deal execution and 
settlement, during which the buyer may elect not to proceed with the purchase.59 This 
may be a valuable example of libertarian paternalism but is not without cost.60 
Extended and uncertain settlement periods will typically raise the price to the buyer, 
                                                 
55 See Securities and Futures and Companies Legislation (Structured Products Amendment) Ordinance 
2011 (8 of 2011 s. 14) and SFO s 104A. Structured product (結構性產品) is now defined as inter alia 
“an instrument under which some or all of the return or amount due [...] or the method of settlement is 
determined by reference to one or more of (i) changes in the price, value or level (or a range within the 
price, value or level) of any type or combination of types of securities, commodity, index, property, 
interest rate, currency exchange rate or futures contract; (ii) changes in the price, value or level (or a 
range within the price, value or level) of any basket of more than one type, or any combination of 
types, of securities, commodity, index, property, interest rate, currency exchange rate or futures 
contract; or (iii) the occurrence or non-occurrence of any specified event or events (excluding an event 
or events relating only to the issuer or guarantor of the instrument or to both the issuer and the 
guarantor) [...] see Cap 571 Sched. 1 Pt. 1 s.1A. 
56 SFO s 104A(1). 
57 See also n 26 above.  
58 See SFC, Form of Information and Undertakings for Unlisted Structured Investment Products, 
available at <http://www.sfc.hk/web/EN/forms/products/forms.html> (visited 25 April 2013). 
59 See SFC, Handbook for Unit Trusts and Mutual Funds, Investment-Linked Assurance Schemes and 
Unlisted Structured Investment Products, May 2012, Part IV Ch. 8, available at <http://en-
rules.sfc.hk/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=3527&element_id=3038> (visited 25 April 2013). 
Sales of products with tenors of up to 365 days are excluded from the guideline. 
60 See Sunstein & Thaler n 25 above, p 1187. 
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is confined to “structured products” as now defined in the SFO, and does nothing to 
ensure that a willing but uncertain buyer has access to usable information while 
considering its decision, even if it takes advice from an unconnected source. One 
further effect is to lessen the likelihood of the buyer succeeding in a subsequent mis-
selling complaint, a problem shared by other point of sale provisions.  
 The same guidelines also require transaction arrangers to provide potential buyers 
with a statement of “Product Key Facts” based on a template that resembles 
provisions in MiFID and the EU Prospectus Directive,61 but lacks the imperative for 
completeness of pertinent, usable information that would allow an informed purchase 
or meaningful product comparisons. The result also resembles the practices described 
by BOCHK.62 
 
Such measures may have be politically expedient but were rushed, are incomplete, and dilute 
the rights provided to investors in new issues by existing legislation and as a result of 
representations made in prospectuses. This weakens disclosure and forestalls questions at the 
time when an issuer or arranger is most open to respond. They might also be seen as 
facilitating arbitrary regulatory behaviour, and an erosion of the rule of law associated with a 
leading international financial centre. 
 
Migrating structured product prospectus rules to the SFO’s investment regime means that 
they would not be affected if a recent SFC proposal is implemented adding provision in the 
Companies Ordinance for sponsors of new share issues to be liable for prospectus due 
                                                 
61 SFC, Illustrative Template for Product Key Facts Statements, Unlisted Structured Investment 
Products, available at 
<http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/html/EN/intermediaries/products/pkfStatements/pkfStatements.html> (visited 
25 April 2013). The Prospectus Directive (Council Directive (EC) 2003/71) stipulates that retail 
securities offerings must include a “Key Investor Information Document” written in plain language. 
62 See n 37 above. 
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diligence.63 This is regrettable. Many structured financial instruments are issued through 
offshore special purpose vehicles established on the transaction arranger’s behalf, as with 
programmes such as Lehman’s, so that the arranger effectively sponsors the issue on behalf of 
an insubstantive vehicle of its own design. Placing a new responsibility on such sponsors 
would create incentives for more complete and informative disclosure. The SFC proposes that 
a sponsor of conventional new listings should “reasonably satisfy itself that all information 
provided to the regulators is accurate, complete and not misleading”,64 and intends that 
sponsors be included in Companies Ordinance provisions specifying civil and criminal 
liabilities for untruths contained in a prospectus, including any material omissions.65 The 
corollary is that it would become incumbent on a sponsor to ensure that issue documents are 
such as to allow a reasonable person to form a fair opinion of the condition and profitability 
of the issuer. This is also a provision of the exchange’s listing rules, albeit that their guidance 
as to the content of prospectuses is unspecific and procedural.66 
 
A comparison with reforms introduced in Singapore suggests a more effective and less 
arbitrary approach. First, changes to consumer protection legislation in 2009 increased the 
scope for complainants to bring actions for mis-selling by making it possible for sales of 
financial services and products to be held contractually unconscionable, similar in effect to 
provisions of Australian federal law.67 Second, the MAS introduced rules in January 2012 that 
involve part of the proposals of this article, albeit without reforming requirements for 
disclosure. Intermediaries must assess the experience of retail investors before marketing 
                                                 
63 The proposal would augment existing directors’ duties, see SFC, “Consultation Paper on the 
Regulation of Sponsors”, May 2012, available at 
<http://www.sfc.hk/sfcConsultation/EN/sfcConsultFileServlet?name=sponsorrglt&type=1&docno=1> 
(visited 25 April 2013).  
64 Ibid. p 5. 
65 See Cap 32 ss 40 & 40A. 
66 The listing rules state at LR 11.07 that a equity new issue prospectus should include “information 
which, according to the particular nature of the issuer and the securities for which listing is sought, is 
necessary to enable an investor to make an informed assessment of the activities, assets and liabilities, 
financial position, management and prospects of the issuer and of its profits and losses and of the rights 
attaching to such securities.” Prospectus content guidance is given in appendices 1C and 1D 
respectively for debt securities and structured products, available at 
<http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/rulesreg/listrules/mbrules/vol2.htm> (visited 25 April 2013). 
67 See n 8 above. 
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certain products including some of moderate complexity, and offer to provide advice if it is 
thought lacking. The client can elect to transact without taking advice but in doing so will 
have been given notice far more adequate than contained in a risk disclosure statement or 
point of sale questionnaire. A contract entered this way becomes a deliberate action and likely 
to be less unequal. It might be argued that the force of these pre-contractual procedures will 
diminish through repetition but the investor’s knowledge and experience would at the same 
time increase. The MAS has made it clear since 2009 in guidance to arrangers and distributors 
operating in Singapore that its business conduct concerns over complex instruments are 
largely confined to retail investors.68 
 
Post-crisis bans and restrictions recall a continuing debate as to how law and regulation can 
properly incur upon freedom of contract, including an irresolvable question as to the 
appropriateness of the state’s involvement in commercial activity. A trend is nonetheless 
clear, that since the late eighteenth century primary legislation and subsidiary regulation have 
set limits to commercial freedom for reasons associated with general welfare or prevailing 
public policy, albeit that the notion of welfare is subject to inherent subjectivity.69 This began 
sporadically, becoming increasingly accepted from the mid-nineteenth century as 
industrialisation greatly increased the numbers formally engaged in commercial activity and 
standardised contracts grew common. The resulting incursion into contractual freedom has 
been variously idiosyncratic,70 associated with the ethics or needs of a particular period,71 
practical,72 or concerning matters of general policy such as employment standards, consumer 
                                                 
68 See MAS, “Review of the Regulatory Regime Governing the Sale and Marketing of Unlisted 
Investment Products” Consultation Paper P001-2009, March 2009.  
69 See also n 18 above. 
70 US law forbids onions from use as a derivative contract underlier, see US Commodity Exchange Act 
7 USC 1 §13–1(a). The ban was procured in the mid-1950s by a farming lobby hostile to Chicago’s 
commodity trading and subsists because the onion is cheap, easily degradable and unpromising as a 
derivative underlier but represents a modest welfare loss given that there is no evidence that trading in 
onion futures or options formerly caused injury to farmers. 
71 Notably limits in many jurisdictions to gambling or the sale of alcohol. 
72 For example, many jurisdictions limit the use of non-indemnity insurance to avoid moral hazard, 
discourage gambling on exogenous events, and because the nature of the insured subject cannot always 
be certain when the contract begins, see Liu, Lejot & Arner, Finance in Asia n 20 above, Ch. 11 n 3 and 
accompanying text. 
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safety or contracts to commit crime.73 From a strong libertarian perspective the law of 
contract is itself regulation.74 
 
Nineteenth century English common law relied on a moral view of contractual obligations 
drawn from a utilitarian notion of promise associated with a “natural” freedom to enter any 
commercial agreement. Contracts were seen as freely struck bargains that assumed an 
equality between parties,75 although this was clearly unreliable in the case of many 
employment contracts, for example. Where the law was ready to interfere in contract 
formation or performance it was justified by a Hobbesian view of the perfidy of contracting 
parties. Since the world was populated by cheats who would naturally wish to evade any 
promise or contractual obligation, the law needed to provide a corrective sanction in 
damages.76  
 
Writing in the mid-1970s, Atiyah saw a zenith of English contractual freedom occurring in 
1875 and captured by Jessel, MR: 
 
                                                 
73 There are nonetheless examples of contractual freedom defeating accepted policy aims, as with 
litigation over the past decade in England, Hong Kong and New York for the recovery of debt claims 
against poor highly indebted states, see n 10 above. 
74 Gilmore separately suggests (as part provocation) that modern Anglo-American contract law had 
become part of tort, and that the idea of contract as a bargain was corroded by new doctrines of 
restitution, promissory estoppel, and lessening reliance on consideration, see G. Gilmore, The Death of 
Contract (Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1974). 
75 D. Hughes Parry, Sanctity of Contract: Hamlyn Lectures 1958 (London, Stevens & Sons, 1959). 
76 See T. Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996) Pt. I, Ch. XIV. The 
argument neglects incentives for compliance arising from the reputational effects of reneging, in some 
cases within a social or business community, or the enforcement mechanisms that such a community 
might develop, see P. Milgrom, D. North & B. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in the Revival of 
Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 Econ. Politics 1, 1. Relational 
contract theory suggests these exist except in exceptional cases where two parties enter and complete a 
single contract knowing with certainty that they will never do so again, which is not characteristic of 
financial activity, see I. Macneil, The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual 
Relations (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1980). Relational contract theory also points to the 
importance of disclosure in financial supervision. The Hobbesian view is echoed in a post-Lehman 
papal encyclical, “Economy and finance, as instruments, can be used badly when those at the helm are 
motivated by purely selfish ends. Instruments that are good in themselves can thereby be transformed 
into harmful ones. But it is man's darkened reason that produces these consequences, not the instrument 
per se.” see Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate, July 2009, Ch. 3.  
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“[If] there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of 
full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and 
that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily should be held sacred […]”77 
 
The truly libertarian soon passed, unsurprisingly since the “optimistic creed” of contracts as 
freely achieved and equal bargains made the courts “extremely hesitant to declare contracts 
void as against public policy.”78 Atiyah argued that contractual freedom began declining after 
1890, but his analysis was made (and partly expressed political preferences) both at a time of 
relatively strong state capitalism in Europe, and before the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
agreements initiated a global increase in private financial contracting. It suggested, for 
example, that the state had become dominant and directly involved in resource allocation, 
price and wage manipulation, and “other legal and fiscal arrangements which depress demand 
for this product or stimulate demand for that.”79 In such a quasi-command economy:  
 
“the growth of the activities of the state has inevitably led to a great increase in the 
number of situations in which relationships between the citizen and the government, 
or some public authority, are now governed by public law rather than private law.”80 
 
It can also be characterized as an ethical shift from contractual freedom and high party 
autonomy towards cooperative and fair means to correct market failure, especially in the 
operation of remedies for contractual disputes.81 The debate says nothing about the political 
                                                 
77 Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson [1875] L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465. The archaic 
language hides the question of gender differences in saving and investment behaviour, see n 42 above. 
The first US case settled by considering contractual freedom is said to have been heard in 1886, prior to 
which the term was unknown, see R. Pound (1909) “Liberty of Contract” 18 Yale LJ 454, 455.  
78 See Kessler n 27 above at pp 630-1. 
79 See Atiyah, Rise and Fall n 6 above p 717. Atiyah confined formal analysis to English law but 
believed his arguments applied broadly in Western Europe and the US, see ibid. at viii. 
80 Ibid. at 719. 
81 For example, see H. Collins The Law of Contract (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 4 edn. 
2003). 
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limits of the welfare state or whether market based solutions assist with problems of 
establishing or maintaining the collective commons or supposedly public goods.82 
 
Conditions changed markedly after 1980, when the Reagan-Thatcher era of deregulation and 
privatisation began to reduce the Anglo-American state’s direct commercial engagement in 
the economy. Even recently, generally liberalising moves have occurred in global financial 
regulation, so for example MiFID is complex and demanding in its original form but supports 
the premise of contractual freedom as a core objective for national regulators. MiFID became 
effective only in late 2007 in the gathering crisis and some of its principles will be sacrificed 
in a re-regulatory wave through amendments and with the introduction of regional EU 
supervisory agencies for banking, securities and insurance, and a new European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) requiring implementation by 2013 of the G-20 and 
Financial Stability Board recommendations on contracting in financial derivatives.83  
 
5. Rethinking re-regulation 
 
Re-regulation as now planned or implemented will risk leaving an unequal, less open system, 
meaning that private organisations and the very wealthy will have access to whatever 
products they wish but the efficiencies of modern finance will be withheld from those that 
remain. The premise of this article is that regulation of financial activity has become 
excessively complex, costly, risk averse and intrusive, and that in certain market segments an 
alternative to outright restriction can be found in the proposition that welfare enhancing 
behavioural change can be encouraged through non-coercive means. An alternative approach 
                                                 
82 Profound differences occur in the treatment of public goods between states and in scholarly opinion, 
as with the archetypal lighthouse, which is often wrongly taken to be a “pure” public good and 
universally funded by the state, see R. Coase (1974) “The Lighthouse in Economics” 7 J L & Econ 35. 
83 Financial Stability Board, Progress since the Washington Summit in the Implementation of the G-20 
Recommendations for Strengthening Financial Stability, 8 November 2010, 12 (available at 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_101111b.htm> visited 25 April 2013). EMIR 
was proposed in 2010 and adopted by the EU Parliament in July 2012. 
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involving intelligent disclosure must question whether banning or severely restricting access 
to certain instruments represents an erosion of commercial freedom that might be justified by 
supervening welfare effects, notably the avoidance of systemic volatility. Do dangers 
associated with complex instruments as unequal bargains that are prone to deliberate or 
inadvertent mis-selling justify heightened supervision and appropriate public responsibility 
but not outright prohibition or sectoral bans? The premise of an alternative is that requiring 
intelligent disclosure may encourage cooperation rather than regulatory capture, and reduce 
the incentives for intermediaries to game the regulatory system.  
 
A simple comparison illustrates the intention. A sign on a sea wall above Hong Kong’s East 
Lamma Channel reads: 
 
“Danger. Please keep away from the promenade under the strong winds and billow.” 
 
This is a sensible non-technical warning of principle. It does nothing to block a pedestrian 
approaching the sea in harsh weather but cautions against recklessness and acts to encourage 
responsible behaviour.84 Failing to do so may have costs, for the individual as well as for the 
emergency services sent to perform a rescue in a hazardous sea, but those costs are not 
systemic such as to demand a physical obstruction. Contrast this with the language carried by 
marketing materials for complex retail financial products in Hong Kong and elsewhere, and 
shown here in the form negotiated by the SFC with arrangers such as Lehman Brothers. 
 
“The notes are not principal protected.” 
 
                                                 
84 Flora Leung has helpfully indicated that the Chinese text is nearly identical, 危險. 
請勿在風浪大時靠近海濱長堤. 
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This is a nonsensical and misconceived way to emphasise risk that has been encouraged by 
the SFC. It is assumed that the warning means that repayment of principal is contingent upon 
the occurrence of non-default events but it fails to say this plainly, indeed a conventional debt 
claim cannot be said to be “principal protected” unless secured and defeased with a cash 
deposit in the same currency as the claim. By implication it also signifies that other 
instruments may be “safe” if they are “principal protected”85 The same material carries the 
injunction: 
 
“These Minibonds are on offer for a limited period only,86 so act now and 
talk to one of our customer service representatives today.”  
 
All product conduct rules must be intelligent, ethical, and avoid the secondary effects of 
providing an exculpatory path for regulators or intermediaries. They need instead to engage 
the regulator. The intention of intelligent disclosure can be shown in four material omissions 
from Lehman’s Minibond prospectuses until 2008, all of which were known to structured 
finance professionals: 
 
 Exorbitant seller incentives. The SFC has since acknowledged this absence by 
indicating in its code of conduct that distributors should disclose the scale of fees paid 
by transaction arrangers.87 
 Lehman’s core transaction purpose, to sell securities inventory and buy third party 
credit protection, which by inference became the investor’s embedded but 
undisclosed obligation. 
                                                 
85 An early Minibond issue was “principal protected” meaning that it was unconditionally guaranteed 
by Lehman Brothers. 
86 Original emphasis. 
87 See n 59 above. 
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 No reference was made over the life of the programme to changing general market 
conditions and asset prices, which would in transactions arranged by reverse enquiry 
justify varying levels of supporting collateral. 
 The legal and commercial consequences of the contractual structure, including the 
investor’s lack of rights against the arranger for inadequate disclosure.88 
 
The SFC reacted by imposing unprecedented point of sale requirements for a contractually 
simple new issue of small denomination Renminbi fixed income notes in July 2009 by China 
Development Bank, presumably fearing that any instrument targeted to retail buyers might be 
confused with a complex product. The prospectus carried a reasonable warning in simple 
language: 
 
“This is an investment product. This is not equivalent to a time deposit, and is not 
protected under the Hong Kong Deposit Protection Scheme. […] Under the code of 
conduct for persons licensed by or registered with the SFC, the placing bank who 
sells our bonds to you is required to assess whether our bonds are suitable for you 
having regard to your financial situation, investment experience and investment 
objectives. You should not invest in our bonds unless such placing bank has 
explained to you that our bonds are suitable for you having made such an 
assessment.”89 
 
                                                 
88 The issue prospectus (see n 15 above) stated at p 4 “Security: AAA-rated collateralised debt 
obligations (CDO) as collateral and swap arrangements with Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. 
as swap counterparty for the payment of principal and interest […]. The CDO will be linked to a 
portfolio of international credits. The CDO will not be an asset-backed securities CDO [nor] linked to 
asset-backed or mortgage-backed securities. […] Repayment in full of the principal of our notes at 
maturity will be dependent upon the redemption in full of the CDO and as such the CDO is a 
significant component of the risk and return profile of our notes.” It thus made no mention of the factor 
that caused the value of the notes to collapse. 
89 China Development Bank, Rmb 2.45% Bonds due 2011 Prospectus, 24 July 2009. 
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The warning was coupled with a less satisfactory exculpatory declaration that the investor 
would be required to sign when placing an order for bonds: 
 
”You have read and understood the terms and conditions of the bonds and application 
procedures set out in this prospectus and agree to be bound by them [...]. You have 
read and understood this prospectus and have relied on no other information or 
material relating to the bonds.”90 
 
The statement signifies a fiction common in professional market practice. The terms of the 
issue were unusual in at least several respects: 
 
 An unusually long grace period was allowed before payment defaults could be 
declared. This could weaken the status of the noteholders vis-à-vis other senior 
unsecured bondholders.  
 All bondholders must separately declare an event of default for their respective 
claims to be recognised.  
 No requirement is made for the bonds to fall immediately due for payment upon an 
event of default. 
 No indication is given as to how illiquidity in the offshore Renminbi market might 
affect the bonds, with the listed “Risk factors” only stating that the concern exists. 
 
None of these points was highlighted for the purpose of risk evaluation or comparison with 
other transactions, which is something an engaged regulator could easily have required. 
 
                                                 
90 Ibid. p 12. Emphasis added. The exclusion covers anything said or written by a distributor at the 
point of sale. 
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Product conduct regulation as now contemplated provides powerful cover for regulatory 
failure, and it is thus unclear that incentives exist for effective and enquiring supervision. The 
reforms highlighted in the preceding section unreasonably assume rational investor behaviour, 
have no influence on usable information, and are likely to strengthen the defence of 
distributors in complaints for mis-selling, making it easier to claim that the investor “was 
given adequate information …” An alternative approach that would not involve a loss of 
welfare would be: 
 
 First, to require that arrangers ensure that pertinent disclosure of how financial 
instruments function is made in transactional dealings with retail and other non-
professional parties, including cases where separate intermediaries function as 
arranger and distributor. This would represent a non-contractual duty of care separate 
from a distributor’s statutory point of sale obligations or any duties of care owed by 
distributors to retail investor clients, and reinforce any common law obligation for the 
arranger to avoid negligence. It conforms with industry recommendations for the 
guidance arrangers must provide to product distributors.91 
 Second, to extend the doctrine of contractual unconscionability to include the mis-
selling of financial services and instruments to retail investors or consumers of 
financial products where those contracts result from great bargaining inequality.92  
 
                                                 
91 See Joint Associations Committee, n 22 above. This proposal also conforms with IOSCO guidelines 
that “It is the responsibility of securities regulators to ensure the appropriate level of transparency about 
products and markets and the integrity of information provided to the market. [...] Enhancing the 
transparency around financial products should give investors the necessary information to assess the 
risks attached to them and, as a result, make better investment choices. Opacity, especially in an 
overconfident market, can encourage collective behaviour which can lead eventually to widespread 
losses, with adverse consequences for the real economy”, see IOSCO “Mitigating Systemic Risk: A 
Role for Securities Regulators, Discussion Paper OR01/11 February 2011. IOSCO’s focus here is 
mainly with lessening investor reliance on credit ratings but it is unclear that this would have made a 
difference after 2007-08 since all benchmarking encourages herd behaviour. 
92 See n 8 above. 
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The first proposal accords with HKMA guidance that banks “should make adequate 
disclosure of relevant material information [...] to customers prior to or at the point of sale. It 
is not sufficient to provide such information after a transaction has been executed. [... Banks] 
should therefore not rely solely on the Product Key Facts Statement for risk disclosure 
purposes [but also] direct customers to the detailed risk disclosures in the offering 
documents.”93 It also accords with prospectus provisions contained in the Companies 
Ordinance that until 2011 applied to structured instruments. 
 
Intelligent disclosure requirements would include a means for investors to compare 
instruments, as contained in Australian regulations since 2011,94 avoid prospectuses and 
similar material being merely a “disclosure of descriptive information with little or no 
analysis on its relevance or impact”,95 and make prospectuses available well before an issue 
takes place, as with Securities Commission Malaysia’s prospectus exposure arrangement, 
which releases prospectuses for inspection and discussion prior to registration. They would 
also recognise that certain contracts have value to users associated with bounded rationality, 
and consider removing the conventional “investment cloak” and instead provide clear 
warnings.  
 
To question increasing limits to contractual freedom is not necessarily to advocate a dogmatic 
laissez-faire economic system nor to encourage the courts to apply severe caveat emptor 
principles. All regulation is a limitation on contractual freedom. The present need is to 
address two questions, how much is acceptable as contractual restraint in terms of social 
policy, and is there a more favourable solution in respect of complex and other financial 
                                                 
93 See HKMA circular, n 7 above. 
94 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, “Prospectuses: Effective Disclosure for Retail 
Investors”, Regulatory Guide 228, 2011, available at 
<http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/rg228-published-10-November-2011-
1.pdf> (visited 25 April 2013). 
95 Idem., “Prospectus Disclosure: Improving Disclosure for Retail Investors”, Consultation Paper 155, 
April 2011, p 7, available at <http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/CP155-
Published-12-April-2011.pdf> (visited 25 April 2013). 
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transactions? Intelligent disclosure represents guidance rather than stricture. The argument 
here is that expediency caused the HKMA and SFC to pursue an extra-judicial block 
settlement to their local Lehman problem. The outcome may have been commercially 
favourable for most noteholders but leaves contractual autonomy weaker and non-accountable 
supervision stronger and more arbitrary. A lack of remedies (through litigation or arbitration) 
against distributors for want of evidence or arrangers for due to the absence of either a 
contractual nexus or informed disclosure requirements suggests that the law of contract will 
suffer a further little death. Breach of increasingly arduous HKMA and SFC codes of conduct 
provides a license threatening sanction against banks or securities dealers but leaves the 
investing public with fewer remedies, and reliant on the moral authority of unchallengeable 
regulators. 
 
